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Statutory Interpretation in Econotopia
Nathan Oman'
Much of the debate in the recent revival of interest in statutory
interpretation centers on whether or not courts should use legisla-
tive history in construing statutes. The consensus in favor of this
practice has come under sharp attack from public choice critics
who argue that traditional models of legislative intent are posi-
tively and normatively incoherent. This paper argues that in ac-
tual practice, courts look at a fairly narrow subset of legislative
history. By thinking about the power to write that legislative his-
tory as a property right and legislatures as markets, it is possible
to use Coase's Theorem and the concept of Pareto optimality to
justify current judicial practice. However, such a justification
suggests that certain aspects of current practice should be
changed.
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Introduction
The last two decades have seen an upsurge in interest in
statutory interpretation. Since the mid-1980s,2 the law re-
views3 and the case reporters 4 have played host to a lively de-
bate on the proper treatment of statutes. The roots of the
revival lie in a multipronged attack on the traditional model of
interpretation that was launched by a group of conservative law
professors and judges - most notably Antonin Scalia and Frank
2. William Eskridge dates the revival of interest in statutory interpretation to
1982. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpretation of Statutes, in A CoMPANmION TO PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 200 (Dennis Patterson, ed. 1996). One com-
mentator, writing in 1983, summed up the then orthodox opinion by noting that
"[tihe general contemporary American view of statutory interpretation is that
there is not a great deal to say about the subject." Robert Weisberg, The Calabre-
sian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213
(1983). Eskridge's date seems to be based on the publication of Guido Calabresi's
influential book, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
3. See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Inter-
pretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 204 (1999)
(summarizing the academic debate).
4. See, e.g., Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 431 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kleinfeld, J. dissenting); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easter-
brook, J.); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski,
J., concurring); Hirschey v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). Judge Posner summarized the debate in one
dissenting opinion, arguing that it represented:
a jurisprudential disagreement that is not less important by virtue of being
unavowed by most judges. It is the disagreement between the severely pos-
itivistic view that the content of law is exhausted in clear, explicit, and defi-
nite enactments by or under express delegation from legislatures, and the
natural lawyer's or legal pragmatist's view that the practice of interpreta-
tion ... authorize[s] judges to enrich positive law with the moral values and
practical concerns of civilized society. Judges who in other respects have
seemed quite similar, such as Holmes and Cardozo, have taken opposite
sides of this issue. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. The first buys
political neutrality and a type of objectivity at the price of substantive injus-
tice, while the second buys justice in the individual case at the price of con-
siderable uncertainty and, not infrequently, judicial willfulness.
United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1334-35 (1990) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Easterbrook.5 Their attack and the responses that it spawned -
critical and appreciative 6 - have led to a widespread reevalua-
tion of long unquestioned assumptions about how to interpret
statutes.
One of the key issues in the debate is the usefulness of leg-
islative history. 7 Legislative history is a capacious term that
can refer to everything from judicial notice of the historical
background giving rise to a particular statute, to a minute anal-
ysis of amendments considered and rejected by the legislature.8
However, most of the debate has centered on a particular subset
of legislative history: committee reports, sponsor statements,
and floor debate. For purposes of this paper, I will use the term
"legislative history" to refer to only these sources. Tradition-
ally, these sources have been consulted as evidence of legisla-
tive intent. Critics, however, have questioned this assumption.
Much of this criticism has centered on a public choice based
attack on the concept of legislative intent. Inspired by economic
style analysis of political institutions, Easterbrook and others
have argued that legislative intent is normatively and posi-
tively incoherent and that statutes should be understood as the
result of either bargains between politicians and interest
5. The most complete statement of Scalia's position can be found in Antonin
Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Fed-
eral Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Easterbrook
launched his critique in Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533 (1983).
6. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621 (1990) (giving an appreciative but critical account of Justice Scalia's textual-
ism); Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia's Revolutionary
Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121 (2000) (arguing that
the textualist attack on legislative history represents a subversive and revolution-
ary plot).
7. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 860 (1992); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legis-
lative History be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807 (1998); Ab-
ner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380 (1987);
Kenneth Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.
371 (1987).
8. One study of the use of authorities by the Supreme Court in construing
statutes found that the Court consulted no less than thirty-nine different kinds of
sources produced by the legislature. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073, 1092
(1992).
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groups or an irreducibly arbitrary legislative process that has
been manipulated by congressional agenda setters.9 Propo-
nents of legislative history have responded by offering more so-
phisticated defenses of legislative intent, arguing that the
public choice attacks need not be fatal to the concept or, alterna-
tively, that the entire enterprise of public choice is misguided.10
This paper offers an alternative justification for the judicial
use of legislative history, one that does not rely on the concept
of legislative intent. Rather, I will argue that much of the tradi-
tional practice of using legislative history can be justified in
terms of promoting legislative efficiency and judicial legitimacy.
Essentially, my claim is that the judicial use of legislative his-
tory can be understood in terms of creating an efficient political
market in Congress. Such a market provides courts with useful
interpretive material, while at the same time maximizing legis-
lative satisfaction in ways that do not threaten judicial legiti-
macy. Far from abandoning legislative history, I argue that
judges should actually formalize their current practice more
rigorously.
In Part I, I offer a summary of the current debate over leg-
islative history with particular attention to the role of public
choice theory. In Part II, I offer some background on how legis-
latures actually create statutory text and legislative history, as
well as background on the way in which courts use it. In Part
III, I offer my theory of political markets and legislative intent.
Finally, in Part IV, I offer some suggestions for how courts
should alter their current practice in light of my theory.
I. Background to the Debate
A. Early Background and the Legal Process Consensus
The common law that the United States inherited from
Great Britain contained an absolute prohibition on the judicial
use of legislative history in construing statutes. According to
eighteenth century English precedent, for judges to inquire into
what members of Parliament said during the course of their de-
liberations would violate the special immunity of parliamentary
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.
[Vol. 25:49
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debate guaranteed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688.11 How-
ever, as the United States developed its own legal traditions,
American courts departed from English precedents. 12 Begin-
ning in the nineteenth century, American courts began to con-
sult the records of congressional debates as part of their effort
to interpret statutes.13
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
courts used canons of construction to narrow the reach of legis-
lation. For example, courts invoked the canon that "statutes in
derogation of common law are to be narrowly construed" to limit
the reach of new laws.' 4 Not surprisingly, progressives who
supported new legislation vigorously attacked such methods,
accusing judges of substituting their own policy preferences for
the will of the legislature.' 5 By the 1950s, a consensus on the
theory of interpreting statutes emerged. This consensus re-
ceived its most forceful articulation in Hart and Sack's mimeo-
11. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B. 1769) (holding that En-
glish Courts could not consult legislative history in construing statutes). This rule
was relaxed in the United Kingdom in Pepper v. Hart, 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L. 1993).
12. For an overview of statutory interpretation in American courts during this
period see chapters 2 ("The United States: From the Revolution to the Founding")
and 3 ("The United States: Nineteenth Century"), in WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES
IN COURT (1999).
13. The seminal case on this issue is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
14. See, e.g., Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557,565 (1879) (limiting the reach of a
statute purporting to make bills of lading negotiable). Recently, some legal histori-
ans have begun to question the traditional story of aggressive use of canons by
anti-legislation judges. Thus William Popkin argues:
If we take this judicial rhetoric and the commentators' reaction at face
value, we would get an unbalanced picture of statutory interpretation. To
be sure, judges were favorably inclined toward preserving the common law,
but it is misleading to generalize to the conclusion that what they did was
judicial usurpation of legitimate lawmaking power - a violation of the sepa-
ration of powers. In many instances their decisions were well within legiti-
mate interpretive boundaries, even if we would consider them wrongheaded,
looking back on the nineteenth century from a twentieth-century, drenched-
in-statutes, legislative-reform-minded perspective.
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 99-100 (1999).
15. See Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1908);
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908); Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
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graphed materials on The Legal Process.16 According to The
Legal Process, statutory interpretation was a matter of courts
imputing a reasonable intent to the legislature and then using
it to fill in any ambiguities in the law. 17 Judges should assume
that legislators are essentially reasonable people pursuing rea-
sonable goals, and the role of the courts is to act as good agents
in discovering and advancing those goals.' 8 In practice, judges
frequently equated reasonable intent with actual intent. As a
result, consulting legislative history became an important part
of statutory interpretation. By the beginning of the 1980s, the
use of legislative history had become ubiquitous. In 1983, Judge
Patricia Wald wrote, "Not once last Term was the Supreme
Court sufficiently confident of the clarity of statutory language
not to double check its meaning with the legislative history.
The language of the 'plain meaning' lingers on in the Court in
opinions, but its spirit is gone."' 9
B. The Public Choice Attack
This consensus rested on the coherence of the concept of
legislative intent. However, in the 1980s this concept came
under attack from legal scholars inspired in part by public
choice theory.20 Public choice is a somewhat amorphous body of
scholarship, but it can be summed up as the application of
microeconomic methods of analysis to the practice of politics. 2'
16. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
17. Id. at 1232.
18. Id.
19. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197-98 (1983).
20. See William Dubinsky, Book Note, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1512, 1517 (1992)
(reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991)) ("Traditionally, legislative history has been viewed as reflecting the intent
of the enacting legislature. Public choice rejects the existence of such coherent
intent.").
21. For a summary of the public choice debate in legal scholarship, see DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUC-
TION (1991). Most of the foundational texts of the public choice movement were
published by economists in the 1960s. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); MANGUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
[Vol. 25:49
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The attack on legislative intent - and by extension legislative
history - employs two different lines of argument. One rests on
the idea of interest group politics. The other rests on voting
theory and the paradoxes of the concept of "majority will."
These two lines of attack, in turn, mirror a debate within public
choice scholarship generally. 22 On one hand, there is the so-
called "Chicago School" of public choice, associated most often
with the work of James Buchanan, which focuses on the incen-
tives that political institutions create for the mobilization of in-
terest groups. 23 On the other hand, there is the so-called
"Rochester School," associated most often with the work of Ken-
neth Arrow and William Riker, which focuses instead on the ar-
bitrary - if not pathological - nature of majority decision-
making procedures. 24
Interest group theorists think of politics as a market in
which politicians sell legislation to interest groups in return for
support at election time and in which competing politicians con-
stantly hammer out deals with each other in the form of legisla-
tion. On their face, such claims seem at least plausible to any
observer of American politics. They also do not seem especially
new. Since at least the time of John Locke, political theorists
have often thought about legislation in terms of contracts be-
tween the governors and the governed. 25 More recently, in a
1975 article, Richard Posner and William Landes suggested
that legislation should be thought of as a contract between po-
litical interests and that courts should approach statutory in-
terpretation in essentially the same way they approach contract
interpretation. 26
22. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative In-
tent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (discussing the Chicago
School - Rochester School divide in the context of law and economics scholarship).
23. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 21.
24. See ARROW, supra note 21; WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPU-
LISM (1982).
25. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 95 (1690), in THE
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 403, 441 (Edwin A. Burtt ed. 1939)
("Men being... by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of
this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own con-
sent, which is done by agreement with other men .... ).
26. William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
2004]
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Because legislation represents a deal between competing
interests, Easterbrook reasons, it does not make sense to con-
ceive of it as the product of a single legislative mind. 27 For Eas-
terbrook, one of the fundamental mistakes made by the
intentionalist approach to interpretation is that it tends to as-
sume that statutes always apply to the cases brought to court
and then uses the concept of "intent" to stretch the statutory
text to cover ambiguous cases. 28 Rather, he argues, judges
should realize that the text of the statute itself represents the
limit of the legislative deal struck and that any attempt to ex-
pand or contract the text would do violence to that underlying
political compromise. 29 Easterbrook also suggests that advanc-
ing "legislative" intent may be far less benign than the inten-
tionalists assume, writing "like most other contemporary
students of this subject, [I] have been persuaded by the work in
public choice that . . . it is wrong to assume that the com-
promises necessary to enact laws are uniformly public-spir-
ited."30 The public choice theorists come to this conclusion by
focusing specifically on the demand side of the political market.
On the basis of a traditional-rational-actor model, they conclude
that interest groups lobby the government for specific benefits.
Politicians respond to these pressures by diffusing the costs of
those benefits over the population at large. Because the share
of any one individual in bearing those costs is so small, citizens
do not have a sufficient incentive to invest in becoming in-
formed and active to counter the interest group influence. The
result is that legislatures will produce legislation that responds
to special interest pleading rather than some conception of the
public interest. The academic literature labels this behavior by
interest groups as "rent seeking," referring to the effort to get
government to confer some benefit that would be unavailable in
27. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 443 (1990).
28. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1983).
29. See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 447 ("There will not be a single objec-
tive, and discretionary interpretation favors some members of the winning coali-
tion over others.").
30. See id. at 441.
[Vol. 25:49
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an otherwise unregulated market. 31 In this pessimistic world
the concept of legislative intent is drained of the normative sig-
nificance that it had for The Legal Process consensus; there are
no reasonable people pursuing reasonable, public-spirited goals
in the public choice universe. 32 Indeed, if legislation represents
cynical rent seeking by interest groups and their politician-
facilitators, rather than advancing the goal of the legislation
(fleecing the broader public) courts should minimize the dam-
age by confining the force of statutes to the plain meaning of
their text.33
A more radical critique has been leveled against the posi-
tive - rather than normative - coherence of legislative intent.
The argument here builds on the work of economist Kenneth
Arrow34 and looks at the supply side of the political market en-
visioned by the public choice theorists. The traditional account
of legislative intent assumes that majority-voting procedures
produce outcomes that reflect the preferences of the majority of
legislators. Building on a problem first posed in the nineteenth
century by the French theorist Condorcet, Arrow and his follow-
ers argue that this optimistic model of majority voting and ma-
jority will is based on a fiction.35 The fiction is that there
actually is some majority will. Imagine a situation in which
there are three legislators (A, B, C) voting on three policy op-
tions (X, Y, Z). Provided that they have different ordinal rank-
ings of preferences (e.g. A prefers X to Y and Y to Z, B prefers Y
to Z and Z to X, etc.), no stable majority can be formed. If X is
paired with Y in a vote, then Y will win; if Y is paired with Z,
31. A.O. Krueger first coined this term in 1974. See A.O. Krueger, The Politi-
cal Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974). For an
extensive discussion of the term and the theories associated with it see TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT SEEKING SOCIETY (James Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). For a
lucid introduction see Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 147 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
32. Cf supra Part I.A.
33. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv.
L. REV. 4, 42 (1984) ("Those who see market failure and conceive statutes as means
to correct these defects, will read the statutes broadly and extend them to cover
new cases. Those who conclude that statutes generally displace markets in order
to transfer rents to political opportunists will take a more beady-eyed view.").
34. See ARROW, supra note 21.
35. See, e.g., Shepsle, supra note 22, at 239.
20041
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then Z will win; but, if Z is paired with X, then X will win.36 In
other words, there is no policy option that cannot be defeated by
one of the other alternatives. Without some arbitrary rule
structuring the voting, legislatures will simply cycle endlessly
through the options. In such a system there is literally no ma-
jority will, and the legislative outcome will hinge entirely on the
order in which the votes are taken. Thus, leaders and agenda
setters will be able to manipulate the procedures to get
whatever outcome they prefer.
The public choice theorists demonstrate that this result,
known as Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, can be generalized far
beyond the simple hypothetical above to include large bodies
like Congress. 37 On the basis of this argument, Kenneth Shep-
sle has reasoned in a much-cited article that the traditional con-
cept of legislative intent is an oxymoron and that courts cannot
posit some majority will that lurks behind statutes.38 "If legis-
lative intent must go, as I urge," Shepsle argued, "then so, too,
must deference to it. The courts cannot defer to something that
is nonsense."39 In the absence of intent, however, there is no
reason to consult legislative history. If committee reports and
floor debates are supposed to be evidence of something that is a
self-contradictory fiction, then they cannot help but mislead.
C. The Response
While there is no doubt that the public choice attack has
been influential, legal scholars continue to defend the concept of
legislative intent and the use of legislative history. The defense
has taken one of two forms. First, there are those who either
reject public choice out of hand and/or simply ignore it. Second,
there are those who argue that even given the force of public
choice arguments, there are reasons to doubt that they have
completely undermined the concept of legislative intent.
Sometime politician and former federal appellate judge Ab-
ner Mikva provides a good example of the first kind of re-
36. See also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAos, AND GOVERNANCE 12-15 (1997)
(discussing Condercet's Paradox and the Arrow Impossibility Theorem).
37. See Shepsle, supra note 22.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 254.
[Vol. 25:49
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/3
ECONOTOPIA
sponse.40  Mikva argues that public choice is essentially
worthless and offers nothing to our understanding of the politi-
cal process. 41 First, he denies that the account of politicians and
interest groups as cynical brokers of rent seeking legislative
deals fits actual reality.42 The model simplifies too much. Some
politicians are "crooks," Mikva admits, but even the "crooks" are
sometimes (often) motivated by sincere concern for the public
interest.43 As for Arrow's Theorem, Mikva argues that social
scientists have been seduced into thinking that mathematics
provide a level of determinacy and certainty about a messy so-
cial reality that it cannot possibly deliver.44 Accordingly, he
would give little deference to the results of mathematically
based social science. 45 Others have made even more extreme
criticisms, arguing that the practice of public choice itself is im-
moral.46 Here, the argument is that public choice's cynical and
pessimistic view of the political process is self-fulfilling, since
the scholarship itself encourages political actors to behave
immorally.47
There have also been more sophisticated - and sympathetic
- responses to the public choice critique. These scholars argue
that despite the theoretical elegance of the public choice models,
actual political practice evidences a more complex design.48
First, they argue that while the rent-seeking model may be use-
ful as a worst-case scenario for institutional design, there are
clear examples of public regarding legislation. 49 In any case,
40. See Abner J. Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 167 (1988). Mikva's response to public choice in this Forward is - not surpris-
ingly given the format - neither comprehensive nor rigorously worked out. How-
ever, it is a revealing and approachable summary of the reactions of many to public
choice.
41. Id. at 176-77.
42. Id. at 167.
43. Id. at 169. Strictly speaking, public choice does not posit politicians as
"crooks." Rather, it simply assumes that they are rational vote maximizers.
Mikva simply ignores this distinction.
44. Id. at 174, 177.
45. Id.
46. See Steven Kelman, 'Public Choice' and Public Spirit, 87 PUB. INTEREST 80
(1987).
47. Mikva, supra note 40, at 174-77.
48. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
49. Id. at 425-37.
2004]
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they argue, the criteria of what counts as public regarding is
fluid enough that it is much more difficult to verify the public
choice hypothesis than its advocates assume. 50 Second, they ar-
gue that notwithstanding the truth of Arrow's Theorem, legisla-
tures do not in fact exhibit the random cycling that it predicts. 51
They argue that this is because the preferences of legislators
are not in fact distributed so as to produce the unstable majori-
ties predicted by Arrow's Theorem and that institutional mech-
anisms in Congress can generate coherent legislative agendas. 52
II. The Reality of Legislative History
At this point, it would be useful to step back from this
highly theoretical debate and take a look at the way in which
Congress actually produces bills and legislative history, and at
how courts actually use it. Against this background, I will then
suggest an alternative way of understanding and defending the
use of legislative history.
A. How a Bill Becomes a Law (and Gets a History)
According to a well-worn maxim, those who like laws and
sausages should not look at the way in which either are made.
Certainly, one need not scratch very far below the civics-book
veneer of the legislative process to be confronted with a bewil-
dering array of arcane procedures and complex political gyra-
tions. The study of Congress is an entire sub-discipline within
political science, and at least since the publication of Woodrow
Wilson's classic Congressional Government in 1885 has been the
subject of intense academic interest.53 Given the sheer volume
of such literature, it would be naive to attempt even a summary
of it in this paper. However, it is important to have a basic
sense of the procedures involved in creating laws (and their leg-
islative histories), as well as understanding some of the com-
mon political practices in which these procedures are
embedded.
50. Id. at 425-27.
51. Id. at 426-35.
52. Id. at 436-37.
53. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (The Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press 1981).
[Vol. 25:49
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The "traditional" path54 for a bill to take in becoming a law
is for a member to "drop" the bill, which is then assigned to the
standing committee with jurisdiction. Oftentimes, complex bills
are referred to several committees. The committees will often
conduct hearings on the bill or on the policy area with which it
is concerned. The committee will then hold a "mark-up" in
which members make amendments. At the completion of this
ritual, the majority and minority committee staffs - under the
direction of the chairperson and ranking member respectively -
will author a committee report explaining the background of the
bill and offering an extended commentary on it. The bill will
then be reported out of committee to the floor of the chamber,
where it will be subject to debate and amendment. A final ver-
sion will be adopted, which will then be sent to the other house
where the process will be repeated. Once both houses have
passed a version of the bill, a conference committee consisting of
members from both houses will then reconcile the two versions
of the bill through its own mark-up process. The conference
committee will then produce a report on the bill similar to the
standing committees' reports. Both houses then vote on the
conference version and the bill is sent to the President for his
signature.
This stylized account misses much of the complexity of real
legislation and comparatively few bills follow this route through
the legislature. 55 First, there is the basic question of who writes
statutory language. Actual members almost never do this. It is
often not even their staffs. Rather, bill language is generally
written by either outside interest groups,56 or by non-partisan
staff attorneys within Congress. Both houses of Congress have
offices of Legislative Counsel.57 These are essentially non-parti-
54. For a sophisticated "civics book" style account of legislation written by a
knowledgeable insider see CHARLES JOHNSON, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE (22d ed.
2000).
55. Much of what follows is based on my personal observations as a Senate
staffer prior to law school.
56. For accounts of lobbyist-written legislation see JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM &
ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE
UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) (describing the legislative battles over
tax reform in the 1980s); RICHARD E. COHEN, WASHINGTON AT WORK: BACK ROOMS
AND CLEAN AIR (1995) (discussing the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act).
57. See 2 U.S.C. § 271 et seq (2002) (establishing the Senate Office of the Leg-
islative Counsel); 2 U.S.C. § 281 et seq. (2002) (establishing the House Office of the
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san, in-house law firms whose duty is to "aid in drafting public
bills and resolutions." 58 They take policy proposals from mem-
bers and their staffs and transform them into statutory
language.
The authorship of committee reports is similarly complex.
Frequently these reports contain detailed legal commentary on
provisions within the statute. Interest groups, who retain at-
torneys to foresee and resolve possible future ambiguities in the
bill, write much of this commentary.5 9 However, sophisticated,
partisan staff members tightly control the inclusion of such ma-
terial. 60 These staff members, in turn, are hired on the basis of
their ideological fit with the members for whom they work and
tend to faithfully execute their principal's agenda. In addition
to ideology, staff members have incentives to follow members'
preferences because they have traditionally had fewer procedu-
ral protections than other federal employees and can be dis-
missed relatively easily.61
The account of floor procedure is likewise very stylized.
Virtually all bills come to the floor of Congress subject to rules
governing the length of debate and the number (and often
scope) of the amendments that can be offered. In the House,
such rules are promulgated for each bill by the Rules Commit-
Legislative Counsel). For background, see KENNETH KOFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL
STAFFS OF CONGRESS 183-200 (1962); Frederic P. Lee, The Office of the Legislative
Counsel, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 381 (1929).
58. 2 U.S.C. § 275 (2002) (setting forth the duties of the Senate Office of the
Legislative Counsel).
59. See Scalia, supra note 5, at 3.
60. See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in
Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1318 (2000) (noting the involvement of
staff and lobbyists in preparing committee reports).
61. For example, until the recent passage of the Congressional Accountability
Act of 1995, congressional staff were exempt from The Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.), The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq.), The Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), Chapter 71 (relating to federal service labor-
management relations) of title 5, United States Code, The Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq.), The Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act (29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.), The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.), Chapter 43 (relating to veterans' employment and reem-
ployment) of title 38, United States Code. See Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995)
(The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995).
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tee, which is tightly controlled by the majority party's leader-
ship.6 2 In the Senate, the terms of debate are generally
controlled by a unanimous consent agreement negotiated by the
majority and minority leadership. Such agreements, however,
can be vitiated by the dissent of a single senator. Accordingly,
they are much more difficult to fashion than the special rules
promulgated by the House Rules Committee. This does not,
however, mean that bills routinely come before the Senate for
wide-open debate and amendment. Since the majority leader
has control over the Senate's calendar, he can simply refuse to
bring up bills until there is some sort of a unanimous consent
agreement.
Debate itself is often highly stylized. In addition to the ex-
pected political partisanship, there are sophisticated attempts
to influence the later interpretation of the bill. Members will
insert complex interpretive memos in the form of speeches into
the record. 63 These speeches are frequently authored by either
staff attorneys or interest group attorneys and often discuss
fairly arcane interpretive issues. In addition, the bill sponsor,
who manages the bill on the floor, will frequently field questions
from other members on specific provisions of the proposed stat-
ute.64 Such "colloquies" are usually carefully scripted, the
words being negotiated and committed to writing in advance.
Indeed many colloquies never actually occur on the floor.
Rather, scripted dialogue is simply inserted into the record.
65
Voting itself is somewhat more complex. In reality, mem-
bers frequently vote on two bills. First, they vote on whether to
vote on the "perfected" bill or the original committee version.
The "perfected" bill is the version produced by all of the floor
amendments. The house then votes on whether to pass or fail
62. See STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL To ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND
SENATE (1989) 241 (discussing the use of the Rules Committee to limit the scope of
amendments on the floor).
63. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES (1994) (discussing the rules
regarding the insertion of statements into the Congressional Record); Scalia, supra
note 5, at 3 (noting that the production of such material is one of the major tasks of
D.C. based lawyers).
64. See William S. Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned Colloquy
and Its Effect in the Interpretation of Statutes, 45 A.B.A. J. 1314, 1314 (1959)
(describing how "friendly colloquies" are used).
65. When I worked on Capitol Hill, one of my routine tasks was inserting such
negotiated colloquies into the record.
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whichever of these two versions they have chosen. In practice,
this means that bills can be subject to a wide variety of success-
ful floor amendments, but nevertheless pass in their original
form. Indeed, the ability to offer the unperfected bill at the end
of debate encourages strategic use of "killer amendments" be-
cause such amendments need not be fatal to the committee ver-
sion of the bill.66 In addition, often non-strategic amendments
passed by different coalitions will, in combination, produce a
bill that is less preferable to those coalitions than the un-
perfected version.67
In addition to these complexities of procedure and legisla-
tive history generation, it is also important to note that fre-
quently one or more of the stages described above are absent.
Entire bills are frequently offered as amendments to other
bills.68 This is an especially popular tactic when the other bill is
an appropriations bill. This is because, unlike run-of-the-mill
legislation, some kind of an appropriations bill must be passed
each session or else, pursuant to the Constitution, the govern-
ment must shut down.69 During periods of intense budget con-
troversy, such as the mid-1980s, the vast bulk of all legislation
will be passed in the form of appropriations riders. 70 This is
because given a limited number of days and a contentious, time-
consuming budget cycle, it is logistically impossible to consider
a large number of other bills independently. Bills passed in the
form of riders can take many forms. Some of them have gone all
the way through the conference committee process and are sim-
ply attached as an amendment as a time saving device. Some
riders may have never even been considered by a standing com-
mittee. Others may have been creported out of committee (with
or without a report) but never considered independently by the
full house. Finally, the reconciliation process is often truncated.
66. See Shepsle, supra note 22, at 245 (discussing the voting procedure).
Shepsle argues that this "'first proposed/last disposed' quality of the committee bill
... confers on it some decided advantages and thus confers on the agenda setters
disproportionate influence over final legislative results." Id.
67. Id.
68. See SMITH, supra note 62, at 29.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No money shall be drawn from the Trea-
sury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
70. SMITH, supra note 62, at 59 (discussing the dominance of appropriations
bills as vehicles for legislation in the 1980s).
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Conference committees may produce no report. Sometimes
there is no conference committee. In such circumstances,
rather than producing a reconciled version of the bill, one house
will simply adopt the other house's version of the bill in place of
its own.71
The vision of the legislative process that emerges from this
description has two important characteristics. First, production
of both the text of the bill and its legislative history are con-
trolled by procedures that are subject to political maneuvering
and neither of them is likely to be the product of any single au-
thor. It is even less likely that the author of either the text or
the legislative history is going to be an actual member of Con-
gress, although this does not seem to mean that members do not
control final products. Rather, both bill text and legislative his-
tory are likely to be written by legally sophisticated parties and
are subject to intense negotiation. Second, the process can be
haphazard and there is no one process by which a bill becomes a
law. Rather, there are many paths that a bill can take and dif-
fering paths will produce differing kinds and quantities of legis-
lative history.
B. What Courts Do With Legislative History
Defenders of the judicial use of legislative history fre-
quently paint the picture of a wise, pragmatic judge sifting
through the record looking for useful information. The claim is
that judges are relatively unconstrained in the kinds of materi-
als that they consult and can effectively distinguish the proba-
tive from the purely political. Thus, Patricia Wald suggests
that judges have the ability to sort out "illuminating ... con-
text" from "irrelevant diversion," and, provided that what mem-
bers say on the floor is probative, it will be considered.
72
However, in actual practice, American judges take a some-
what less holistic approach. Rather, they privilege a small sub-
set of legislative materials, namely committee reports and
sponsor statements. Certainly, there is no clear rule, and the
underlying consistency of the practice is often obscured by lan-
71. Shepsle, supra note 22, at 247.
72. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History
in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39
Am. U. L. REV. 277, 309 (1990).
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guage implying a canvassing of the whole record.73 However,
the underlying reality does reflect a kind of rule. Generally
speaking, courts look first to the committee reports (if they ex-
ist).74 For example, the Supreme Court is twice as likely to re-
fer to committee reports as floor debate.7 5 In practice American
judges - despite the holistic language of apologists like Judge
Wald - generally treat floor debates in the same way that En-
glish courts are required to treat them by the holding in Pepper
v. Hart.76 Unlike American courts, which have no formal rules
as to what sorts of legislative materials they may or may not
consult, 77 the House of Lords promulgated a rule governing
what sorts of legislative history may be consulted. 78 In relaxing
the rule forbidding resort to Hansards, the official record of par-
liamentary debates, the House of Lords gave specific guidance
to lower courts. They held:
... that the exclusionary rule [against consulting legislative
history] should be relaxed so as to permit reference to Parlia-
mentary materials where:
(a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an
absurdity;
(b) the material relied on consists of one or more statements
by a minister or other promoter of the Bill together if nec-
73. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 491 (2001) ("In-
deed, this Court, after reviewing the entire legislative history . . ."); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 191 (1989) ("The Court's interpretation of
§ 1981 has been based upon a full and considered review of the statute's ... legisla-
tive history.").
74. See, e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 134-44 (1988) (dis-
cussing the legislative history of Black Lung Benefits Reform Act beginning with
committee reports and then consulting managers' statements, and finally turning
to statements made during debate).
75. Congressional reports were cited in 32% of the cases, while congressional
floor debates were cited in only 16.9% of the cases. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of
Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073,
1093 (1992).
76. 1 All E.R. 42.
77. Courts generally regard the so-called "plain meaning rule," under which
courts consult legislative history only when the statute is ambiguous on its face, as
'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, [which] does not preclude consid-
eration of persuasive evidence if it exists." Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.). On the general demise of the plain
meaning rule in practice prior to the academic revival of statutory interpretation
see Wald, supra note 19, at 197-98.
78. Pepper, 1 All E.R. 42.
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essary with such other Parliamentary material as is nec-
essary to understand such statements and their effect;
(c) the statements relied on are clear. 79
The rule of Pepper, therefore, creates a clear hierarchy of
sources. Courts are to look first to the statements of ministers
and then to the statements of bill promoters. They are not
given license to freely comb through the reports of parliamen-
tary debates looking for probative materials.
American discussions of legislative history reveal similar
limiting principles with regard to floor debates. Most commen-
tators and judges are leery of floor debates. One scholar has
suggested that "[a]mong the least reliable kinds of legislative
history are floor debates. Not only are they laden with sales
talk, but.., it would be rare for the authors of a statute to take
such references into account."80 However, the "qualms of courts
and commentators about relying on statements made during
floor debates ... often disappear when the speaker is the spon-
sor of the bill or amendment that includes the statutory provi-
sion being interpreted."8' As a result, in practice, American
judges generally privilege the sponsor's statement.8 2
Sometimes, however, as a result of floor debate judges will
disregard the interpretive gloss offered by the sponsor or the
committee report. This happens when other members vigor-
ously challenge those interpretations during debate. The Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 199183 provides an example of this ap-
proach.8 4 In 1991, Congress amended the civil rights laws to
overturn a Supreme Court decision that made it more difficult
for plaintiffs to prevail in anti-discrimination suits.8 5 As part of
the deal struck between congressional leaders and the White
79. Id. at 69.
80. Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative His-
tory, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1132 (1983).
81. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION AND STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION 791 (2d ed. 1995).
82. See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528 (1972)
(relying almost entirely on statements by the sponsor of the bill, Sen. Edward Ken-
nedy, in construing the statute).
83. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
84. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
85. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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House, a two-page sponsor's memo inserted into the Congres-
sional Record by Senator John Danforth was to constitute the
sole legislative history of the Act.8 6 However, Senators and
Representatives on both sides of the aisle offered lengthy com-
mentaries on various provisions of the Act in an attempt to in-
fluence its later interpretation.8 7 The result was a recorded
debate reflecting a patchwork of possible interpretive ap-
proaches. Writing shortly after the Act was passed, one scholar
noted that in the face of such polyphony, "[wihat the federal
courts will eventually make of all this is anybody's guess."8 8 In
the fullness of time, the ambiguities of the Act came before the
Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products.8 9 The Court
was asked to interpret the Act in light of the legislative his-
tory.90 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens took a very
conventional approach. Canvassing the floor debate, he con-
cluded that "the legislative history discloses some frankly parti-
san statements about the [point at issue], but those statements
cannot be read as reflecting any general agreement."91
Foreswearing legislative history, the Court went on to decide
the question without reference to congressional statements. 92
Sometimes courts will simply ignore relevant legislative
history. One of the most notable examples of this is the case of
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.93 The case involved
the question of whether or not Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act forbade voluntary affirmative action programs by private
employers. 94 The relevant provision of the Act provided that:
86. MELNICK, supra note 63, at 4-5.
87. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 262-63 (discussing floor debate on the bill); MEL-
NICK, supra note 63, at 4-6 (discussing the debates).
88. MELNICK, supra note 63, at 6.
89. 511 U.S. at 244.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 262.
92. Id. at 265 (arguing that the "presumption against retroactive legislation is
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence").
93. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
94. There was some dispute as to whether or not the program at issue in
Weber was truly voluntary. See id. at 222-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting
that the affirmative action program at issue was created "under pressure from the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance"). The majority opinion, however, chose to
"emphasize at the outset the narrowness of [their decision]" noting that the "plan
[at issue] does not involve state action." Id. at 200 (Brennan, J.).
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice ... to discriminate
against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program to
provide apprenticeship of other training.
95
Weber was excluded from a training program that had a quota
of 50% black and 50% white participation because he was
white.9 6 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan argued that
"[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."97 He then ar-
gued on the basis of the context in which the Act had been intro-
duced and the statements of some of its supporters, that the
primary purpose of Title VII was to address "the plight of the
Negro in our economy."98 Since affirmative action programs
served to advance this purpose, they could not be forbidden by
the Act.99 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Rehnquist excoriated
the majority for ignoring statements by key supporters that di-
rectly conflicted with the Court's holding. 100 During the course
of the debate over the bill, Southern Democrats opposed to the
measure repeatedly made the argument that it would require
employers to implement affirmative action programs. In re-
sponding to these arguments, the Senate floor managers of the
bill,101 as well as key supporters, repeatedly denied that it
would create any such requirement, arguing that rather it
would forbid such programs by private parties. 10 2 An interpre-
tive memorandum placed in the record by the Senate managers
stated:
[An employer] would not be obliged - or indeed permitted - to fire
whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future va-
95. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200 n.3 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (2000)).
96. Id. at 199.
97. Id. at 201 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
98. Id. at 202-08 (discussing the context and purposes of the Act) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
99. Id. at 208 ("The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute.").
100. Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (comparing the ma-
jority opinion to totalitarian propaganda in George Orwell's novel 1984).
101. Because the bill originated in the House there was no formal Senate
sponsor. See id. at 239.
102. Id. at 235-52 (discussing the Senate debates).
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cancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority
rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.10 3
Yet, despite this language, Justice Rehnquist could garner only
one other vote for his position. 0 4
Of late, it seems that courts - especially the Supreme Court
- have been less likely to consult or discuss legislative his-
tory.10 5 It is difficult to access the precise import of this shift. It
may be that the textualist critiques of legislative history have
been persuading judges of the error of their ways. The presence
of vocal textualists such as Scalia, Easterbrook, and Kozinski
may mean that opinion writers are disciplining their use of leg-
islative history.
Justice Scalia has made the theoretical aspects of statutory inter-
pretation vivid and relevant to everyone. A practitioner writing a
Supreme Court brief who ignore[s] Justice Scalia's attacks upon
the conventional wisdom about statutory interpretation [does] so
at her own peril. The practitioner in the lower federal courts [is]
likely to encounter a fair number of judges who found Scalia's ar-
guments persuasive, and a greater number who [pay] heed to
them, if only to avoid being reversed. 10 6
Perhaps that vividness has led some users of legislative history
to "see the light."10 7 However, there continue to be judges who
have few qualms about consulting legislative history, and a ma-
jority of Supreme Court Justices have taken the position that
there is nothing wrong per se with judicial resort to such
sources. Likewise, appellate advocates continue to cite and dis-
cuss legislative history in their briefs. For example, a search of
103. Id. at 240 (emphasis added). One of Weber's arguments was that black
employees with less seniority had been preferred to white employees with more
seniority. Id. at 199.
104. The other vote came from Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 219. For an in-
sightful discussion of this case, as well as the dynamics of the judicial, congres-
sional, and presidential responses that it provoked see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/ Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79
CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
105. See Frickey, supra note 3, at 203.
106. Id.
107. See Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1437 (1994) (One possible evidence of increased textualist influence
is a surge in the use of dictionaries by the Supreme Court); Cf MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. ATT Corp., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (discussing at some length the
relative merits of various dictionaries).
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Westlaw revealed that in the last year at least 281 briefs dis-
cussing legislative history were submitted to the Supreme
Court. 0 8 It may be the case that judges continue to consult leg-
islative history but simply omit its discussion from their opin-
ions while reaching the same result. Indeed, one empirical
study has suggested that the interpretive methodologies of
judges have little - if any - influence on the outcome of cases. 10 9
Finally, it may simply be that judges who are basically comfort-
able with using legislative history have nevertheless been per-
suaded to pay closer attention to the statutory text. Thus,
judges may be adopting the stance of one academic critic of
Scalia and Easterbrook who opined that nevertheless,
the new textualists remind us that statutory interpretation is,
most of all, textual analysis. We start with the text, and most
practitioners end with the text when rendering 'quick and dirty'
advice to their clients. The Court's longstanding tendency to ig-
nore the text and go straight to legislative history in many cases
is a tradition in need of correction, and I applaud the new textual-
ists for turning us back to the text."i0
Regardless of how one explains this phenomena, it seems clear
that the critics of legislative history have been far from com-
pletely victorious in court.
III. Statutory Interpretation in Econotopia
With this background it is possible to offer an alternative
justification for the use of legislative history. The public choice
critique reveals that, at the very least, the concept of legislative
intent is problematic. However, one need not justify legislative
history with reference to such a concept. Regardless of how one
assesses the public choice debate, courts will always have to in-
terpret statutes. The nineteenth-century legal theorist Francis
Leiber demonstrated the inevitability of legal interpretation.
108. A search of Westlaw's SCT-BRIEF database on April 29, 2002 using the
search term "DA (AFT 04/29/2001 & BEF 04/29/2002) & "LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY" produced 281 documents.
109. Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter?: A Case
Study, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1409 (2000) (presenting an empirical study of decisions
involving both Judge Posner - a vocal pragmatist - and Judge Easterbrook - a
vocal textualist - finding negligible differences in how they decided cases involving
statutory construction).
110. Eskridge Jr., supra note 6, at 690.
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He noted that the only way to make a legal specification clearer
was to add another specification, which in turn would give rise
to the need to create a specification for the specification, and so
on ad infinitum.
Where would be the end? We are constrained then, always, to
leave a considerable part of our meaning to be found out by inter-
pretation, which, in many cases must necessarily cause greater or
less obscurity with regard to the exact meaning, which our words
were intended to convey.111
In light of this predicament, courts will inevitably look for tools
in construing statutes. Those who attack the use of legislative
history fully realize this and often argue for various canons of
construction as an alternative to legislative history.1 2 Yet even
if one accepts the public choice critique of legislative intent, a
question about legislative history still remains: Does it provide
a useful aid in resolving statutory ambiguity?
At one level the answer to this question is clearly "yes."
Statutes frequently contain gaps and ambiguities that courts
must resolve. There are a variety of ways of filling these gaps.
Traditionally, courts turned to canons of construction to provide
background assumptions. 113 Recently, background rules have
enjoyed something of a renaissance, with courts 114 and scholars
arguing that gaps in laws should be filled in with background
norms. 1 5 At a more prosaic level, uniform laws are enacted
111. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1114 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994), quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HERMENEUTICS 17 (1880).
112. Scalia, supra note 5, at 8.
113. See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950). For a modern reassessment of Llewellyn's attack see John F. Manning,
Legal Realism & The Canons' Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 283 (2002).
114. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 244 (answering the unspecified issue of
retroactive application of a statute with reference to a background norm against ex
post facto laws).
115. According to one scholar, "the real news.., is that that a large and grow-
ing number of academics (and academics turned judges) now believe in the utility
of canons of construction . . . and, second, that the newly faithful cover a broad
philosophical spectrum." Manning, supra note 113, at 284. Compare Cass R. Sun-
stein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1989)
(a liberal arguing for the use of background rules of interpretation) with Scalia,
supra note 5, at 8 (a conservative making similar arguments).
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with a set of comments that give guidance on the purposes and
possible interpretation of various provisions. 116 Committee re-
ports and sponsor statements frequently contain detailed com-
mentary anticipating interpretive questions that are likely to
arise. This commentary is generally prepared by legally sophis-
ticated parties and often provides concrete solutions to specific
problems. 117 To the extent that judicial interpretation is a mat-
ter of finding determinate answers to questions about ambigu-
ous language and resolving disputes that such ambiguities
create, legislative history is useful.
There is, of course, another part of the question: Why pick
views enshrined in committee reports and sponsor statements,
rather than some other set of views? This question is essen-
tially distributive. The current practice privileges the views of
committee members and bill sponsors. The question inevitably
arises as to why courts should choose those members, rather
than others. Why not simply give equal weight to the state-
ments of all members? It turns out that the kind of economic
analysis of political processes that underlies public choice may
provide a possible answer to this question.
A. Legislative History in Econotopia
Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine a
country called Econotopia that has legislative and judicial insti-
tutions that closely parallel those of the United States. In
Econotopia, statutes are inevitably drafted using language that
must later be interpreted. This task falls to the courts of
Econotopia, but they wish to give legislators some influence as
to how the laws they pass will later be interpreted. However,
unlike in the United States, in Econotopia politicians and inter-
est groups can bargain costlessly with one another, exchanging
political favors for interpretive influence. Senator Smith may
have influence over the later interpretation of the Mothers and
Apple Pie Bill but will use that influence on behalf of Senator
Jones or the National Association of Maternal Pastry Chefs in
return for support on some other issue. There are lots of medi-
ums in which such a trade might take place: votes on future
116. See, e.g., U.C.C.A.
117. See supra Part II.B.
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issues ("I'll vote for your pet bill."), influence with other mem-
bers ("I will twist Senator Doe's arm for you. He owes me."),
electoral support ("I can promise that the Maternal Pastry
Chefs will turn out for you come election day."), or simply future
gratitude ("Give this to me, and I'll help you out in the future.").
Only legislators' creativity and the ethics laws of Econotopia,
which like the United States forbid simple bribery, 118 limit the
form that such transactions can take.119 Finally, the political
actors in Econotopia are unusually savvy operators, making all
deals on the basis of a steely-eyed cost-benefit analysis. 20
Now suppose that the Supreme Court of Econotopia is try-
ing to formulate a rule as to which legislators should have inter-
pretive influence over the later construction of a statute. The
Supreme Court is composed entirely of red-headed justices, and
the justices decide on that basis that red-headed legislators are
likely to be the best interpreters of statutes. Under such a rule,
legislators and interest groups would bargain with the red-
headed legislators in order to get their particular view of a
given bill enshrined as the legislative interpretation that will
later influence judicial construction. If it turned out that the
red-headed legislators had particularly strong views about the
bill in question they might simply refuse to deal, forgoing the
benefits of any deals, and opting instead to enshrine their own
views in the record.
We would expect the same view to prevail if the Court
adopted a different rule, say one that gave interpretive influ-
ence only to the sole bald legislator in Econotopia. The same
legislators and interest groups would now try to make deals
with the bald legislator. If the red-headed legislators had been
so attached to a particular interpretation that they would re-
fuse to deal, we would expect to see them making offers to the
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (forbidding bribery of a "person who has been
selected to be a public official").
119. Although because transacting in Econotopia is costless, there are no
costs associated with imagining or choosing among the various forms.
120. This is not to suggest that the politicians of Econotopia are without prin-
ciple. Senator Smith may have such strong convictions about the way in which the
Mothers and Apple Pie Act should be interpreted that he will refuse to "make a
deal" no matter what Senator Jones or the Maternal Pastry Chefs offer. However,
in Econotopia politicians are perfectly willing to make deals with even their most
strident critic if they think that the deal, on balance, will make them better off,
advance their agenda, or what not.
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bald legislator in return for influence. In the end, the Court
would have the same legislative interpretation of the statute,
because the same players will be bargaining over meaning re-
gardless of how the initial "right to influence interpretation" is
allocated. 121 This will hold true even if the Court, motivated by
a strong egalitarian ethic, adopted a rule giving all members of
the legislature equal influence. Since political bargaining is
costless in Econotopia, the player with the strongest interpre-
tive preference would "purchase" influence from all of the legis-
lators, like a speculator amassing a debtors' small and widely
dispersed negotiable notes into a single, large claim.
Generalizing from these examples, we can see that from the
perspective of interpretation the rule adopted by the Supreme
Court of Econotopia is irrelevant. As long as legislators can
bargain costlessly with one another over the content of the leg-
islative history, the same views will always be enshrined in the
legislative record. In Econotopia, the Court need not worry
about fashioning a rule that captures the "correct" or "true" leg-
islative history. This is not to imply that the rule adopted by
the Court will not have important consequences. Any rule that
it adopts will have effects on the distribution of power within
the legislature. Certainly, a rule that looks only to the views of
red-headed legislators is going to give them more power vis-h-
vis bald legislators. However, such distributional questions
concern issues of political power. If legislators are constantly
trading votes, future support, influence with others, and other
forms of political power in return for authoritative legislative
history, the legislators who control that history will be in a posi-
tion to politically profit at the expense of those who must
purchase such history. However, provided that legislators can
bargain costlessly, the rule chosen does not necessarily impli-
cate the content of the interpretation-influencing legislative
record.
B. Coase's Theorem and Interpretive Influence
By now Econotopia should be familiar to any student of law
and economics. It is a political instantiation of Coase's Theo-
121. Of course the bald legislator might refuse to deal, but if this is the case,
then we would expect that he would be the victorious bargainer under a rule giving
interpretive power to the red-headed legislator.
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rem. 122 "The theorem, slightly oversimplified . . . is that if
transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a property
right will not affect the ultimate uses of the property."1 23 The
term property is slightly misleading, since Coase's Theorem can
be applied to a wide variety of legal rights. Thus, in one classic
example a factory emits pollution that causes $375 in damages
to neighboring homeowners' drying laundry. It would cost $150
to install a smokescreen on the factory or $250 to purchase dry-
ers for all of the homeowners. Provided that the parties can
bargain costlessly, it does not matter whether courts give the
factory the right to pollute or the homeowners the right to clean
laundry. If the right is given to the homeowners, then the fac-
tory will purchase a smokescreen in order to avoid the $375 of
damages. If the right is given to the factory, the homeowners
will pay the factory $150 to install the smokescreen rather than
pay $250 to purchase dryers. Regardless of the rule adopted,
you get the same final outcome: $150 spent on pollution
control.124
Legislative history is much like an option contract. In a
standard option contract, purchasers buy the right to purchase
some commodity or security at a fixed price in the future.125 If
the market price in the future is above the option price, then the
option becomes valuable to its holder. If the market price is be-
low the option price, then it is not. Essentially, an option is a
right that you purchase now that might or might not become a
valuable opportunity at some point in the future. Favorable
legislative history is similar. An interpretation inserted into
the legislative record now might or might not become valuable
depending on whether or not the issue to which it is addressed
arises and whether or not the court is influenced by the inter-
pretation offered. The value of any given interpretation offered
in a committee report or a sponsor statement is uncertain and
contingent. But like an option, such uncertainty can be dis-
122. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(first articulating what came to be known as Coase's Theorem).
123. RICmHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 8 (5th ed. 1998).
124. This example is taken from A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAw AND ECONOMICS 11-12 (2d ed. 1989).
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1094 (6th ed. 1990).
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counted to yield a current value, and political players can bar-
gain on the basis of that discounted value.
Coase's Theorem teaches us that regardless of how we as-
sign this right ex ante, in a world of costless bargaining, players
in the political market will trade to an efficient ex post outcome.
More precisely, the parties will bargain to a Pareto optimal out-
come. Pareto optimality means simply that it is not possible to
reassign the right in such a way that at least one person will be
made better off and no one will be made worse off.126 Put an-
other way, the kind of perfectly operating market assumed by
Coase's Theorem will always assign the right to the same
player, the player willing to pay the most for the right.
C. Politics and Pareto Optimality
In other contexts, many legal theorists have drawn norma-
tive implications from Coase's Theorem. In the real world, they
point out, bargaining is not costless. There are search costs, in-
formation costs, and the like. This means that the ex ante dis-
tribution of any right will have serious consequences. In the
presence of such transaction costs, we cannot assume that play-
ers will bargain to efficient outcomes. It is thus possible to as-
sign a right in such a way that one would have an ex post non-
Pareto optimal distribution. This in turn would imply a dead-
weight loss: there will be some losers without any off-setting
winners. Accordingly, they argue that we should assign rights
ex ante to the person who would hold them ex post in a world of
zero transaction costs. Put another way, legal rules should
mimic the results of perfectly functioning markets. 127
In certain contexts the appeal of this argument is fairly
clear. Inefficient allocation of economic resources makes society
as a whole poorer. By constructing a legal regime that mimics a
perfectly functioning market, we can increase the size of soci-
ety's collective pie. Adopting inefficient rules means that even
if we make A better off, we are making B worse off by more than
the increase in A's welfare. Of course, there are those who dis-
pute whether or not this is a sufficient - or even relevant - nor-
126. JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 182-83 (2d
ed. 1990).
127. Id. at 194-96.
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mative criteria. 128 Still, the appeal of the rule, even if it is not
universal, is at least intuitively obvious.
However, it is less clear whether or not Pareto optimal out-
comes in the kind of political market described above are desira-
ble. In a commercial market, it is easy to see how an efficient
outcome maximizes wealth. In a market for interpretive influ-
ence, political satisfaction is what an efficient outcome would
maximize. However, it is not political satisfaction in some abso-
lute sense. Rather, it is political satisfaction in the face of the
judicial decision to grant legislators influence over the later in-
terpretation of statutes. If one takes the choice of collectively
giving legislators some form of influence over the later interpre-
tation of statutes as given, one could argue a Pareto optimal
rule is normatively desirable because it makes legislators as a
group better off. Of course, there is no reason per se that we
should care about legislators' satisfaction. Certainly, institu-
tions like frequent elections and a free press can make the lives
of congresspersons unpleasant.
There is another reason, however, to favor an efficient allo-
cation of interpretive influence. In the context of a judicially
created rule, maximizing legislators' satisfaction with a Pareto
optimal rule is likely to protect judicial legitimacy. Consider
two analogies. The first is Alexander Bickel's famous discus-
sion of "the passive virtues" in The Least Dangerous Branch.129
Bickel's argument is that the Supreme Court frequently uses
doctrines such as standing to avoid deciding controversial cases
that could compromise the Court's political legitimacy.130 Such
a husbanding of judicial legitimacy allows the judiciary to exer-
cise counter-majoritarian review within the context of a demo-
cratic polity. The second analogy is the courts' treatment of
questions involving parliamentary procedures promulgated by
128. For example, John Rawls seems to argue that any action which makes
the worst off members of society better off is desirable even if it makes better off
members worse off in a dramatically disproportionate way. See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?: A Response
to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980) (arguing that the
concept of efficiency tells us nothing about the justice or injustice of any rule of
law).
129. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing the "passive virtues").
130. Id.
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Congress to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." 13 1 Courts
have been extremely leery of requests that they review such
rules.132 Thus, the D.C. Circuit (where virtually all of these
suits occur) has held that courts should exercise their equitable
power to deny a remedy even in cases where internal legislative
rules present constitutional violations. 133 This odd holding is
justified by the need to avoid judicial entanglement in internal
legislative politics. 3 4 Academic commentary suggests that
courts should refuse to adjudicate such disputes not because of
any legal impediment, but simply because involvement could be
too politically dangerous for the courts.
135
The basic logic of both of these arguments can be applied to
the question of which bits of legislative history the courts
should consult when construing statutes. Long ago, Aristotle
realized that the boundary between the generality of legal rules
and the resolution of particular "hard cases" marked a frontier
of power. Indeed, Aristotle designated the boundary as the bor-
der between the rule of law and the rule of men:
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and per-
sonal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of
persons, should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is
unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all con-
tingencies, to make an exact pronouncement. 13
6
His remarks serve as a reminder that "the interpretation of
statutes is not an abstract exercise, it is about the exercise of
power in our political system." 37 Put more philosophically, "the
important question concerning statutory interpretation . . .is
political rather than epistemic .... ,,138 Picking one source of
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (rejecting a challenge
to the House of Representatives method of determining the presence of a quorum).
Ballin was the first case in which the Court was asked to rule on an internal legis-
lative rule. Since then, courts have generally followed its deferential approach.
See Michael B. Miller, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political"
Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1348-53 (1990) (discussing Bal-
lin and its progeny).
133. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
134. Id. at 1174.
135. Miller, supra note 132, at 1364-74.
136. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 148 (Ernest Barker trans., 1948) (emphasis added).
137. Mikva & Lane, supra note 6, at 136.
138. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 271 (1990).
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legislative history rather than another has the potential to
transfer power from one legislator to another, because it can
give the legislator controlling the history the opportunity to sell
it to some other legislator with stronger preferences in return
for some of that legislator's political power. 139 To regularly force
Senator Smith to pay off Senator Jones could "cut very deep into
the very being of Congress. Courts ought not[, one might argue,]
.. enter this political thicket."140 Legislators and their constit-
uents are likely to view such interference as political meddling.
This in turn would undermine the courts' claim to be neutrally
applying the law, a claim on which their legitimacy - and power
- rests. One judge encapsulated this concern by writing that
"[wihen the public comes to understand that judges are simply
unelected, life-tenured bureaucrats dressed in black, making
policy decisions just like other government officials, the moral
authority of the courts will be seriously undermined and popu-
lar obeisance to the courts' constitutional judgments will be
jeopardized."' 4 1
From this point of view, an efficient rule for distributing
interpretive influence will have two positive effects. First, it
will reduce the number of political transactions over the legisla-
tive record. A world in which legislators must routinely make
deals with the red-headed senator in order to influence later in-
terpretation would repeatedly remind legislators of the way in
which courts are giving the red-headed senator power. 142 How-
ever, a world in which few such deals occur because the distri-
bution is efficient is less likely to emphasize judicial
interference. Second, deviation from an efficient rule will, by
definition, make at least one legislator worse off such that the
legislator's loss will be greater than any gain realized by an-
other legislator. Accordingly, if we assume that animus to-
wards the courts is a function of the intensity of disappointed
139. By "power" I mean things like votes on future legislation, influence with
other legislators, and the myriad of other mediums in which political deals are
made. See supra Part III.A.
140. Cf Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (arguing that courts
ought not to be involved in congressional redistricting).
141. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be an Impeachable
Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 814 (1998).
142. See supra Part III.A.
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preferences, 14 3 then the animus felt by the losing legislator in
such a scenario is likely to be greater than any gratitude felt by
the winning legislator.'" It is not difficult to see how after sev-
eral rounds of interpretation involving different pieces of legis-
lation about which different legislators have strong interpretive
preferences that the overall intensity of anti-court animus
within the legislature would increase faster than any pro-court
gratitude. Thus, while there may be no value per se in effi-
ciently maximizing legislators' satisfaction, maximizing it can
serve to shield the courts and husband judicial legitimacy.
D. Rejustifying the Judicial Use of Legislative History
Granting the conceptualization of legislative history as a
property right and the arguments made in favor of efficiency,
we can answer the normative question of what approach courts
should take in using legislative history. Theoretically, the an-
swer to this question is simple: courts should rely on the legisla-
tive history created by those actors who would bargain to
control the "authoritative" legislative history in Econotopia. In
practice, it turns out that this means that courts should look to
committee reports and sponsor statements.
The sponsor of a bill is likely to be the legislator who is
most interested in the final shape of the bill. Her choice to
sponsor the bill represents a strongly expressed interest in the
issue addressed by the legislation. Likewise, the committee
members who control committee report language are likely to
have particular interest in - and strong preferences about - the
policy areas within the committee's jurisdiction. Not surpris-
ingly, such members often have strong preferences about the
way in which legislation is interpreted. They are thus likely to
be the members who would bargain to control authoritative his-
tory in Econotopia. Of course, bill sponsorship and committee
membership are at best imperfect signals of strong interpretive
143. Where intensity is defined in terms of willingness to pay to satisfy the
preferences.
144. Assuming, of course, that because of real-world transaction costs, the two
parties cannot make a deal. In a costless world, the two could simply make a deal.
This presumably would reduce the level of animus felt toward the courts, because
at least the legislators' preferences would be satisfied. However, there still might
be animus coming from the necessity of entering into the transaction in the first
place.
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preferences. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine situations in
which bill sponsors and committee chairpersons are not the po-
litical actors who would bargain to control the history.
However, their positions provide a second reason why
courts would want to assign the rights to them ex ante. Re-
member that in Econotopia it did not matter how the courts al-
located rights; political actors would always bargain to efficient
outcomes. The reason that we worry about the allocation of
rights in the real world is because transaction costs exist, and
parties will have difficulty bargaining to efficient outcomes.
Obviously, courts have imperfect information at best about who
those particular parties are actually going to be. However, one
thing that we can assume is that if we assign the right to a
party that can bargain at low cost with the group of players who
are most likely to have the strongest preferences, we are much
more likely to get efficient outcomes. As I pointed out in Part II,
statutory text is almost always a product of negotiation among
various interested parties. These parties are likely to have the
strongest preferences about the later interpretation of the stat-
ute both because they have strong interests in the underlying
policy issues and because they are likely to have the legal so-
phistication to foresee and form preferences about future inter-
pretive issues. Furthermore, the fact that they already have
access to sponsors and committee members from the negotia-
tions over statutory text - which is largely controlled by these
legislators145 - means that these same players are likely to be
able to negotiate over legislative history inexpensively. Thus,
by linking control over statutory text with control over interpre-
tive influence, we can closely mimic the conditions of
Econotopia (lots of information and low transaction costs) in
those cases where we are not mimicking the actual outcomes of
Econotopia. Either way, we are likely to get efficient
outcomes. 146
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. Note, this argument will not apply to the text of the statute itself. This is
because no political actor has a property right in the actual text, which can only be
changed by a majority vote (of either the committee considering it or the whole
house considering it). One might be tempted to argue that there is a property right
in the actual votes of legislators and that in Econotopia, at least, one could bargain
over the votes on various textual amendments to reach a Pareto optimal outcome.
However, such a rosy view ignores the insights of Kenneth Arrow and the Roches-
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Consider the example of the Year 2000 Liability Act. 147 In
anticipation of computer problems expected by the change of the
year 2000, Congress passed legislation designed to limit the lia-
bility of companies that tried to fix the problem before end of
1999.148 The Senate created the Special Committee on the Year
2000 Technology Problem to study the problem, and produce
legislation on the subject. At the time, creating some sort of
limited liability shield for firms trying to fix Y2K problems was
a fairly high-profile issue with certain segments of the business
community, and Senator John McCain, who was gearing up for
his presidential bid, decided that he wanted to claim sponsor-
ship of the issue. He had a staffer contact senior staff in other
offices that had been working on the issue. On the basis of that
short conversation, McCain's staff produced a bill, and McCain
proposed and immediately reported it out of his own powerful
Commerce Committee to the floor of the Senate. 149 The Senate's
Republican leadership, eager to pass a bill before the end of the
session, agreed to let McCain sponsor the bill, but only on the
condition that he substitute a new text for his own hastily con-
structed bill, which mishandled many of the issues considered
by the Special Committee on the Year 2000.150 McCain agreed
to the compromise and the bill passed. 15
1
None of this maneuvering appears in the Congressional Re-
cord. However, it does illustrate two points. First, the judicial
ter School. Because of the intransitivity of collective preferences, even in a world
of costless bargaining-in fact more so-we would expect cycling. See supra Part
I.B.
147. My narrative of events is based on discussions with many of the staffers
who participated in events but who have asked that they not be formally cited.
148. Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999). Computers were sup-
posed to malfunction because their two-digit year record in their internal calendar
would read "2000" as "1900" causing all sorts of technological problems. Fortu-
nately, whether through the millions of dollars spent on retrofitting or overblown
predictions of global catastrophe, 2000 came and went with relatively few calendar
induced computer glitches. For a discussion of the bill's specific provisions see
Year 2000 Liability Provisions, in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1999, at
22-20, 22-21 (David Rapp ed., 2000).
149. See Law Enacted to Limit Firms' Liability From Y2K-Related Computer
Glitches, in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1999, at 22-9 (David Rapp ed.,
2000) (stating the McCain bill became S. 96) [hereinafter Y2K-Related Computer
Glitches].
150. See S. Amend. 608 (June 9, 1999).
151. Y2K-Related Computer Glitches, supra note 149, at 22-9.
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decision to privilege statements made by the sponsor of a bill is
largely arbitrary, resting on what is often, at best, a benign fic-
tion of legislative expertise. Second, in large part because of
that judicial fiction, sponsorship decreases the cost of bargain-
ing. McCain had little or no knowledge of the issues involved in
the anticipated Y2K litigation. However, he knew that busi-
nesses, eager to influence the later judicial interpretation of the
bill, would feed him statements which he could then read into
the record, and that he could parlay his position as a privileged
mouthpiece into political support for his upcoming battles in the
presidential primaries. Indeed, during debate on the measure,
he was eager to trumpet the access that sponsorship had given
him to top CEOs in the high technology industry.152 In the end,
the "quality" of the legislative record may well have been unaf-
fected by Senator McCain's insertion of himself into the process.
As Justice Breyer has suggested, legislative history is an insti-
tutional product and much of its value for judges lies in the way
in which it channels the diverse expertise of effected interests,
staff, and legislators to courts. 153
Of course, giving preference to committee reports and spon-
sor statements is still an imperfect way of mimicking a perfectly
functioning market. It is possible to imagine plausible situa-
tions in which, because of collective action problems, we would
expect non-Pareto optimal outcomes. To simplify the example,
imagine that we can measure the "price" that legislators are
willing to pay for interpretive influence in fungible units called
"political pennies." Suppose that there is one representative
who is willing to pay 100 political pennies to get his favored
interpretation in the record, and there are 100 representatives
willing to pay two political pennies to get a single, differing in-
terpretation in the record. In Econotopia, the two-penny repre-
sentatives could costlessly aggregate and outbid the 100-penny
legislator. However, in the real world there will invariably be
situations in which - even given a rule that allocates power of
the legislative history to the person who can bargain at least
cost - it will not be possible to aggregate all of the two-penny
representatives. The result is that the 100-penny member will
152. Id. at 22-9, 22-13, 22-14 (discussing McCain's floor statements about his
discussions with Andrew S. Grove, CEO of Intel Corp.).
153. Breyer, supra note 7, at 856.
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be able to purchase the legislative history even though it would
not be optimal for him to do so. All that can be said against
such a criticism, it seems to me, is that assigning control over
the legislative history to sponsors and committees will mitigate
the problem somewhat by making it less costly to bargain. It
does not seem that there is any rule that is likely to eliminate
this problem. Accordingly, the logic of the second-best solution
counsels in favor of allocating control over legislative history to
those who currently have control: committees and sponsors.
All of this suggests that the current judicial use of legisla-
tive history can be justified as an efficient political market in
interpretive influence. Whatever the weaknesses such an
account might have - most notably the underlying normative
ambiguity of Pareto optimality - it does have significant ad-
vantages over the traditional defenses of legislative history.
This argument does not rest on any questionable assumptions
about the coherency of legislative intent. Rather, it relies on
assumptions much closer to those of the public choice theorists.
It too views legislators as engaged in political bargaining. How-
ever, unlike legislative intent, its coherence is not tied to major-
ity voting procedures. It is thus immune from criticisms based
on Arrow's Theorem. It is still open to the basic thrust of the
rent-seeking analysis offered by Easterbrook. However, it
seems no more open to these challenges than the text of stat-
utes themselves. If anything, it is less open to such critiques.
Statutory text gains force on the basis of a majority vote. It can
be imposed on unwilling losers. In contrast, the particular in-
terpretation enshrined in the legislative history is much more
likely to result from voluntary transactions. Any force it ac-
quires comes from the underlying vote on the statute itself, a
vote which even vociferous critics like Easterbrook are reluctant
to question.
IV. Implications
The justification for legislative history offered above, how-
ever, is not entirely apologetic for current practice. It also
has some critical bite, suggesting ways in which courts might
want to reformulate their current practice. In particular, courts
should take a "harder," more formalistic approach to legislative
history and should stop trying to holistically interpret the re-
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cord on the basis of some underlying intent. In particular, the
current practice may frequently lead to inefficient outcomes and
de-incentivize the production of useful legislative history.
A. Making Blowhards Bargain
Currently, courts will frequently abandon the interpreta-
tion offered in committee reports and sponsor statements if it
appears that this interpretation is controversial among other
members.154 However, conceptualizing legislative history as a
political option market suggests that this approach is mistaken.
There are two intuitions driving the current practice. The
first is that legislative history should be consulted as evidence
of legislative intent.155 Generally, courts seem to be willing to
believe that committee reports and sponsor statements reflect
this intent. 156 However, when the floor debate indicates that a
particular interpretation is controversial, courts lose their faith
in the probative value of the normally privileged sources. 57 Af-
ter all, a particular interpretation cannot reflect the actual in-
tent of the legislature when so many individual legislators
reject it. The second intuition is political. Faced with a legisla-
tive record of controversy on the floor, courts are eager not to
appear to be taking sides. Picking a winner or a loser is likely to
offend political actors and undermine the judiciary. In such sit-
uations, "reliance on legislative history is often the 'equivalent
of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads
of the guests for one's friends."' 58
Both of these intuitions, however, are misguided. As the
public choice critique demonstrates, the concept of legislative
intent is deeply problematic. 5 9 Accepting legislative history be-
cause it creates an efficient market in interpretive influence,
however, means that the concept of legislative intent is beside
the point. The question is not whether the legislative history
reflects some imagined intent. Rather, it is whether the materi-
154. See supra Part II.B.
155. See supra Part I.A.
156. See supra Part II.B.
157. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263-72.
158. Cf Broad, 85 F.3d at 435 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993)).
159. See supra Part I.B.
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als used by the courts reflect an efficient distribution of inter-
pretive influence. Floor debate does not provide any incentive
for members to consider the strength of their commitment to
their particular interpretation. Offering such an interpretation
is virtually costless, since it takes a member very little in terms
of time or resources to insert a statement into the record. Fur-
thermore, because normally their interpretation is not given
great weight and is therefore not particularly valuable to other
political actors, they have few opportunity costs.
Abner Mikva, a former congressman, tells the following
story that illustrates this dynamic. He writes:
When the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
provisions of the Organized Crime Act of 1970 came up for floor
debate, I expressed my opposition in hyperbolic terms, parading
one horrible example after another before the House. Since the
managers had the number of votes needed for passage, and I was
speaking mostly to an empty House, they did not even bother to
answer me. My remarks have been used ever since as legislative
history to prove the broad scope of RICO. If I knew then what I
know now (that was my first term in Congress) I would have gone
to the Committee Chairman and said that I had 36 members who
were going to raise a lot of sand unless he agreed to engage in
some floor dialogue with me to limit future interpretations of the
RICO language. At the point he might well have agreed and I
could have made the opposite - and less mischievous - legisla-
tive history.160
Notice the differing incentives that the value of the legislative
history created. The freshman congressman spouted off with-
out considering the consequences of his remarks. Dialogue with
the committee chairman, however, had to be negotiated over.
Sponsors and committee chairs also face few direct costs to
promulgating a particular interpretation. However, all things
being equal, under current judicial practice, their interpretation
is much more valuable. Accordingly, they do face opportunity
costs in offering an interpretation, namely the cost of forgoing
the "sale" of the interpretation to another actor. Thus, there is
little reason to suppose that statements made by ordinary legis-
lators in the course of debate reflect anything more than politi-
160. Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PrIT. L. REv. 627,
632 (1987).
2004]
39
PACE LAW REVIEW
cal hot air.161 In contrast, statements made by committees and
sponsors are much more likely to reflect the strong preferences
of some committed political actor.
This dynamic also shows that the intuition about getting
involved in political fights is wrong. First, the fact that courts
are interpreting a statute means that they will inevitably have
to offer some construction of the language. If the proper inter-
pretation was in fact controversial in the legislature, it is an
illusion for courts to suppose that they can decide the case with-
out offending at least some of the legislators. However, by re-
treating completely from the legislative history in the face of
controversy, the courts make the mistake of treating all legisla-
tive statements as reflecting equal political intensity. Perhaps
Senator Blowhard will be offended if the courts accept the inter-
pretation offered by the bill's sponsor rather than his. However,
refusing to accept the interpretation offered by the sponsor is
nevertheless a choice, and there is no reason to suppose that
she - or the interests that she speaks for - will not be as of-
fended as Senator Blowhard. In fact, given the differing incen-
tives that members face, there is good reason to believe the
interpretation she offered reflects more intense preferences. In
the end, to consistently allow the loud and the loquacious to ne-
gate the views of sponsors and committees is more likely to cre-
ate anti-court political animus, since such statements will
reflect less intensely held views than those contained in reports
and sponsor statements.
In contrast, a relatively formal and rigid rule - "the inter-
pretation of sponsors and committees will always be preferred
to rival interpretations offered during debate" - creates incen-
tives that are less likely to result in animus against the courts.
First, it will encourage those with genuinely strong preferences
about the interpretation of statutory language to bargain for
their preferred outcome. Second, consistently applying such a
rule is less likely to look like political favoritism. Under the
current practice, there is no clear understanding of how much
161. Cf. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 262 ("[Tlhe legislative history discloses some
frankly partisan statements about the meaning of the final effective date lan-
guage, but those statements cannot plausibly be read as reflecting any general
agreement."); Wald, supra note 72, at 309 (suggesting that legislative history is a
mix of "illuminating... context" and "irrelevant diversion").
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controversy there must be before courts reject a sponsor or com-
mittee's interpretation. Sometimes they accept it, sometimes
they do not. Such imprecision leaves judges open to the accusa-
tion that in consulting legislative history they are "looking over
the heads at a party for their friends"162 far more than a rigid
rule would.
B. Increasing the Incentive to Produce
Taking it as given that legislative history provides courts
with useful material in construing statutes,163 one problem they
face is that many bills have no useable legislative history at
all. 64 Adopting a more rigid approach, however, could help to
mitigate this problem. This is because such an approach would
increase the incentive to produce such history.
The more valuable legislative history is to political actors,
the more likely they are to produce it. In terms of interpretive
influence, the current value of any piece of legislative history is
a function of three factors: First, the importance of the interpre-
tive issue; second, the probability that the particular issue will
arise; third, the probability that the courts will consider the leg-
islative history. Essentially, the present value of the legislative
history is the first factor discounted by the second two. 65 If
players think that a particular issue is important, then they are
likely to try to create legislative history influencing that issue.
However, if they think that the issue is unlikely to arise or that
when it does arise, that courts are unlikely to defer to legisla-
tive history, then creating such history is less valuable.
Of these three factors, courts have no control over the first
two. However, they have exclusive control over the third factor.
The greater the certainty that they can provide ex ante that
particular legislative history will be consulted ex post, then the
greater the incentive to create such history. However, when
courts abandon sponsor statements and committee reports in
162. See supra Part III.
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. See id.
165. It will also be discounted by the period of time between the creation of
the legislative history and the case in which the interpretive issue is expected to
arise. Issues far in the future are less valuable than issues in the immediate
future.
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the face of controversy on the floor, they diminish the incentive
to create such history. Likewise, when they engage in holistic
searches for legislative intent, they reduce the certainty that
political actors have about their ability to influence later inter-
pretation. In contrast, rigidly following a fairly formal rule
would dramatically increase the probability that particular
pieces of legislative history will be consulted. This, in turn,
means that when the history is being created there will be less
discounting by political actors. The result would be more useful
material for courts faced with tricky issues of construction.
Conclusion
Public choice critics have severely - perhaps fatally - un-
dermined the traditional justification for legislative history.
However, attention to the way in which legislative history is ac-
tually used suggests that it can be thought of as a kind of prop-
erty right. Reconceptualizing the issue in terms of a political
market seems to avoid at least some of the criticisms of the pub-
lic choice theorists. Certainly, it is methodologically similar to
their approach. However, far from undermining the traditional
practice, thinking of legislative history as a property right sug-
gests that current judicial practice is actually efficient and de-
sirable. Far from abandoning their current practice, judges
should tighten it up. This new theory suggests that judges
should give up searches for legislative intent and platitudes
about holistic reconstruction of the whole record. A focus on the
actual incentives that judicial practice creates suggests that
what is needed is not a retreat into a fog of pragmatic rhetoric166
but a steely-eyed formalization of current judicial practice.
166. William Eskridge, Jr. was an avowed pragmatist. See William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Eskridge, supra note 2, at 207 (stating "[t]hese thinkers
emphasize the eclectic and instrumental features of the process tradition .... Law
involves a balance between form and substance, tradition and innovation, text and
context. Pragmatism probably best captures the actual practice of courts and
agencies, but provides little normative direction for that practice.").
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